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The Good as Unity:
Its Role in the Good Life
in Plato's Later Thought
Cynthia Hampton
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Ohio University
In the sixth book of the R e p u b l i c . Socrates begins leading his
interlocutors down the 'longer road' that leads to the Form of
the Good which is to complete the earlier account of virtue given
in Book IV.
The end of this road in the Republic is reached via
the sketch of the Good portrayed in the famous Sun, Line, and
Cave passages.
In this paper, I wish to suggest that the road
does not, in fact, end here, but extends to the account of the
Good offered in one of Plato's latest dialogues, the Phi lebus .
This
account,
like
the one
in the Repub lie before
it, has
ontological, epistemological and ethical d i m e n s i o n s , but in this
paper, I shall concentrate on those aspects that have special
relevance to the nature of the good life.
Specifically, I shall
focus my discussion on the role the Good as unity plays in the
good life.
My argument shall run as follows.
In the R e p u b l 1c . the Good's
role is ambiguous since its unity is depicted in two different
ways:
as an organic whole of interrelated parts or aspects, and
as an
absolute and transcendent One.
Corresponding to each of
these models of the Good's unity is a different picture of the
good life.
According to the first model, we should seek to
integrate the diversity of our experience, but according to the
second,
we
should strive to minimize or even eliminate
all
diversity.
In the Ph i l e b u s . it becomes clearer that the second
model of unity is the one we should take as our ideal.
Thus the
good life is one in which various types of knowledge and pleasure
are
properly
arranged
in
imitation
of
the
universal
order
provided by the Forms.
The Phil e b u s . then, presents us with a
fuller understanding of how we are to use the Good as the pattern
for our l i v e s .
Let us first consider a few crucial features of the account
given in the R e p u b l i c .
In Book VI (at 504A-506E),
Socrates
discusses why the Good is the highest form of study, and then
proposes to give his own opinion of what the Good is like by
comparing it to its offspring, the sun.
During this discussion,
which functions as a sort of prologue to the Sun, Line and Cave,
Socrates makes a number of claims about why the study of the Good
is essential.
One crucial point is that an
account of the
virtues without the Good lacks precision and completeness because
it is in relation to the Good that just actions and other things
become beneficial.
Thus the knowledge of anything else is of no
help if we do not know the Good (505A-B).
The ultimate goal of
study for the philosopher -rulers must be the Good itself since it
is by 'looking' to it as a model that they are able to order
their own souls, the polis and its citizens properly (540B; see
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also 484D; 500D-E, and 506A-B).
The use of the Good as a model
of order suggests that the Good is unity in some sense.
If so,
then we can understand better why the Good is the ultimate goal
of desire which everyone should strive to acquire (505D).
For in
order to experience the true value of anything, one must be aware
of its proper place within the whole of
reality for which the
Good is the model.
But how is the Good the model for all of reality in general,
and for human life in particular?
To give a definitive answer to
this
question
is well beyond
the scope of this paper and,
perhaps, not fruitful to pursue in detail.
After all, Socrates
in the Republic (and also in the Philebus) warns us that he can
provide only an outline of the Good.
Still, we must have some
idea of what its general contours are like in order to use it to
guide our lives. It seems to me that one crucial feature of the
Good is its unity.
The unity of the Good is depicted in two
different ways in the R e p u b l i c . One is that the Good encompasses
the World of the Forms and orders them, as it were, within
itself.
The Forms,
in turn,
are responsible for the basic
structure of the sensible world.
The other model of the Good
is
that of an absolute s i m p l e , and transcendent One.
Corresponding
to these two models are different pictures of the good life.
According
to
the
first
model,
those
who
aspire
to pattern
themselves after the Good will be concerned with ordering the
different aspects of their lives so as to reflect the ideal order
of the Intelligible World as much as possible.
In the rightly
ordered or virtuous life,
the diversity of one's experience is
not reduced but integrated to form an organic whole.
According
to
the other model,
imitation of the Good
will
require a
reduction or even an elimination of diversity, a merging of all
aspects of life into one.
The best life is that of contemplation
the pursuit of mystical union with the One.
The Republic contains
passages that can be
used to support
either of these views of the Good.
Indeed, one could say that
the first model is the one Aristotle developed into his ideal of
the life of practical v i r t u e ,^ while the second model is the one
that
evolved
into Neoplatonism.
Let us briefly review the
passages that give rise to each of these models of the Good.
Plato suggests in several places in the Republic that the Good
is
the
unity
of distinct but
interrelated
Forms.
On the
ontological level,
Plato says that Forms combine with each other
(476A) and that the Good presides over the Intelligible World
yet is still a part of it, as the sun is part of the sensible
world.
It is reasonable to assume that the Good unifies the
Forms by being present to them, not by being a transcendent One.
The Sun Analogy also suggests that the Good has at least one
aspect, Truth, which it emanates as the sun does its light (507D508E).
The idea that unity among interrelated parts, rather than
absolute simplicity,
is Plato's ideal is most evident in the
tripartite division of the State and soul.
In both cases,
oneness
is
achieved
through
the
unity
of
distinct
but
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interrelated parts.
Justice requires that each part retains its
separate function while temperance insures that the parts will be
in accord through their consent to be governed by reason (442D443E) .
In short,
the
goal
is
the
harmonious
blending
of
distinguishable notes (443C-E) not the reduction of all into one
monotonous hum.
We can find other evidence, however, that the Good stands
in sharp contrast with plurality.
As far as the ontological
dimension of the Good is concerned, there is no clear indication
that the other Forms are aspects of the Good.
In fact, the
reference in the Republic to the communion of the Forms is just
that--a passing reference.
Most of the time what is stressed is
the unitary nature of a Form compared to the multiplicity of its
sensible instances.
So, one would expect the Good to be the most
unitary entity of all.
Socrates, in fact, explicitly states that
Truth, along with knowledge,
is ."Good-1 ike " but not the Good
itself, which is beyond even Being in dignity and power (509A-B).
Such language suggests the absolute transcendence of the Good.^
Plato seems to endorse uniformity, and not just unity, as the
ideal for the good life in many famous (and perhaps, infamous)
passages.
After all, a pluralistic society where the conflicting
interests of different ethnic and religious groups within the
State are resolved with peaceful compromises could be said to be
unified, especially where citizens owe allegiance to the greater
community as well as to smaller groups.
But the minimization of
conflict,
or even its absence,
is not the ultimate goal for
Plato.^
He regards conflict as bad only insofar as he sees it as
a threat to the organic oneness of the State with which citizens
are to identify, seeing themselves as members of a single body
(562B-D).
Such complete identification with the State is crucial
for the upper tier of society; hence Plato's proposals for the
abolition of private families and property for the guardians.
But even
the artisans
are
to find their primary source of
identity in the work that they do for the commonweal.
Thus Plato
says of a carpenter who has contracted a chronic disease that he
will no longer wish to live if he can no longer contribute to
society (406D-407A).^ Such passages make it clear that even when
the diversity of human nature requires some division of labor,
the ultimate goal is oneness with the State.
Differences are
tolerated but only as means to the end of oneness^.
In this
sense, the different occupations are like the alternative paths
in Hinduism;
one chooses
the marga that best suits
one's
temperament
but
what
really
matters
is
the
common
goal:
liberation from the wheel of life and death.^
Similar passages occur in Plato's discussion of the soul.
The
nature
of
that
exemplary
human
being,
the
philosopher,
he
describes as follows:
In one whose passions flow towards knowledge and all that kind
of t h i n g , they would concentrate, I think, upon the pleasures of
the mind alone and by itself, and he would give up the pleasures
of the body, if he is a true philosopher and does not merely
pretend to-be one (485E)®.
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Because of passages like this one,
Plato has sometimes been
accused of reducing the human being to pure reason^ and the good
life to one of "fanatical single-mindedness."^®
Although it would be foolish to pretend that Plato presents in
the Philebus an account of the good as unity
which is completely
free of the ambiguities found in the Republic . a much clearer
picture does emerge in this later dialogue. *·
I shall suggest
that the Good in the Philebus is a unity of its different parts
or aspects.
The ideal of the good life is one in which various
types
of
knowledge
and
pleasure
are
properly arranged
in
imitation of the universal
order provided by the
Forms.
This
last point is an important one, for the Philebus retains the
notion that we can only realize our human good by shaping our
lives so that they are true to the universal Good which unites
all things.
Thus the starting-point of his ethics differs from
that of Aristotle, as Aristotle himself o b s e r v e d . ^
The Good in
Plato's later thought is neither Aristotelian nor Neoplatonic.
Surprisingly enough , Plato remains , to the end, a p la.torilst .
First consider the ontological dimension of the Good in the
Philebus .
In both the beginning and the end
of the dialogue ,
Plato depicts the Good as a one
which is not a completely
transcendent
simple,
but
rather
is
a
unified whole
which
manifests itself in distinct but related aspects.
Early on, the
Good is described as an ungenerated and imperishable unit (m o n a d )
which is both one and many (1 2 C -1 6 A ) . In order to understand how
the Good,
or any other unit,
is both one and many, Socrates
introduces what he calls the Divine Method.
This method is
grounded on the assumption that all existent entities are from
one and many and have inherent: within them limit (p e r a s ) and
indefiniteness (ape ira) . The practitioners of this method assume
that there is one Form ^
(or unit) for everything, and then look
for it.
They then look for the t w o ,etc. according to whatever
type ofForm is being examined.
Each original unity (form) must
be seen not simply as being composed of
one and
many and
indefiniteness,
but how many it is (i.e. how many parts or
aspects it has ) must be made clear.
Only at this point may each
unity be allowed to pass unhindered into the indefinite.
That
is,
one may acknowledge
that the unit or Form has sensible
instances which are infinite in number and indefinite in aspect.
The key is to concentrate not on the indefinite many but on the
intermediate many, the aspects of the one.
The illustrations used to clarify this method are
linguistic
and musical sound.
In the
case of learning to pronounce the
letters
of the alphabet, for example, one realizes that although
the sounds that can be vocalized are infinite,
the rules of
grammar which determine the number and nature of distinguishable
linguistic s ounds--vowels, semi-vowels, mutes - -make linguistic
sound one comprehensive u n i t .^
One cannot learn to pronoun the
letters
in
isolation
from
one
another,
but
must
do so by
combining them.
Thus the role of
grammar is crucial in that it
reveals
the
proper
ways
to
unite
the
letters
(18B-D).
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[Presumably, letters form syllables, then nouns and verbs, then
sentences. Cf. Cratvlus 424D-425A.]
The essence of the Divine
Method, then, is to identify the intermediate aspects of the unit
and how they are related to each other, to the unit, and to the
infinite sensible instances.
Whatever the mechanics involved in actually plying the Divine
Method, its aim is clear enough:
to understand both the unit and
infinitely diverse sensible phenomena by recognizing those parts
or aspects which lie between them.
This
important point
suggests that the goal of knowledge is neither contemplation of
the absolute One nor the experience of infinite variety, but the
articulation of unity as it is expressed in multiplicity.
That
Plato uses linguistic and musical sound as his illustrations of
the Divine Method is no accident, for such examples depict the
basic structure of reality as an organic whole rather than a mere
aggregate
ofindividuals.
Parts are not discrete units but
elements that
blend
together
like
sounds
that
form
spoken
syllables
or
musical
scales. [Cf.
Theatetus
203E-204A where
Socrates explicitly claims that the syllable is a single entity
with a character of its own different from the letters that make
it up; it is an example of a whole which is different from the
aggregate of its parts.]
Plato's use of auditory examples also
presents an alternative to the model of knowledge which relies on
the analogies of sight and/or touch.
Such a model is prevalent
in the Republic and other middle d i a l o g u e s . T h e v i s u a l / tac tile
model suggests that the soul directly encounters the Forms
as
the eyes
or hand must be in the
immediate presence of the
sensible in order to see or grasp its properties.
Such a model
suggests that the ultimate objects of knowledge, the Forms, are
absolute simples with no parts:
they can be seen all at once or
grasped in their entirety.
But the auditory model suggested by
spoken and musical sound emphasizes the interconnections of the
Forms which must be articulated as a system in order to be
understood.
Even the story told about the origins of the Divine Method
emphasizes
the point that in the Philebus what is important is
how the
different ontological levels are related.
According to
Socrates, the Divine Method was "thrown down by the gods in a
blaze of light from some
Prometheus" (16C5-6).
The fire the
mythical
Titan
stole
from
the
gods
to
give
to
humankind
symbolizes the enlightenment which helps us rise out of the
condition
described by Aeschylus
in Prometheus
Bound as "a
dreamlike feebleness by which the race of man is held in bondage"
(11. 549-550).
Note how much these words sound like Plato's
depiction of the prisoners in the Cave!
In the R e p u b l i c . though,
what is 'divine' and 'blessed' is simply
the contemplation ofthe
Good alone, not the bringing of this vision back down into the
Cave (517B-519E).
In the Philebus . however,
the method that
provides the link of the one to the many--of the gods to h u m a n s - is said to be divine.
Our participation in the
divine is seen
in terms of our ability
to identify the presence of the one
within the many.
Earlier, Socrates had noted that the one and
5

the many are perennially present in all our l o g o i . reasoning and
discourse (15D).
Our task is to become aware of this presence
and to embody it in our l i v e s ^ .
At the end of the Philebus . Plato reveals that
through the
agency of certain aspects of the Good (i.e. Proportion, Beauty,
and Truth) the good life becomes possible for us.
True to the
general emphasis on interrelations in this dialogue, Socrates and
Protarchus agreed early on that the good life consists of neither
pleasure nor knowledge by themselves but the right mixture of the
two (18E-22C).
But the question of which should be the dominant
element, knowledge or pleasure, is one that they do not consider
to be answered in full even after lengthy discussion about each.
The reason is that in order to make clear whether knowledge
(including
practical
reasoning,
i.e.
phrones is ) or
pleasure
contributes more to the goodness of the good, mixed life "we must
get a clear conception, or at least an outline
( tvpon) of the
Good"
(61A4-5).
Whereas in the Republic such
an outline was
provided by the Sun analogy, in the Philebus it is presented by
considering
three
aspects
of
the
Good:
Truth,
Measure
or
Proportion,
and Beauty.
These three, when considered as one
(i.e.
the Good), are the cause of goodness in
the mixed life
(6 5A 1 -5 ) .
Consider carefully how the Good is the cause of the mixture.
Truth is said to enable the mixture--or anything else--to
come
into being (64B2-3) as well as to become intelligible.
As has
been widely noted, ^
the use of truth (ale the ia) here clearly
means
something
other
than
just the
correspondence of
a
proposition to reality, or a type of cognition.
After all, the
forms of cognition or knowledge were already included in the good
mixed life earlier in the
dialogue
(55C-59D); if that
is all
truth means then nothing new would be added to the mixture.
In
fact, the presence of truth is necessary for the good mixture
simply to exist, and in this sense is above knowledge.
The same
is true of the ontological dimension to the Sun Analogy
of the
Renublie.
The parallel between the sun's light and the Good's
truth extends beyond the visual model of knowledge.
Socrates
points out that just as the sun not only makes things visible but
also provides for their generation, growth and nurture, so too
the Good is responsible not only for the intelligibility of the
Forms but also for their Being (509B).
Although Plato does not
explicitly say that the Good provides for
Being via Truth, it is
a reasonable inference to make using the sun as the analogue
since
clearly
s u n l i g h t is
responsible
directly
for
the
generation, growth and nurture of sensibles.
The Philebus is
more explicit;
it states that Truth is that part of the Good
which enables the mixture to exist at all.
If it weren't for
Truth, there would be no knowledge and pleasure to mix together
and form the good life.
There would be no reality at all, at
either the universal or the human level.
Proportion,
or
Measure,
is
likewise essential for
the
components of the good life to compose a mixture rather than a
jumbled heap.
In other words, Proportion brings unity.
Beauty,
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although this is not said explicitly, presumably brings a certain
type of order, the perfect order that something displays once it
has
fully
realized
its
function or achieved
its
excellence
(a r e t e ).
This
idea
is
implied
by
the
connection
between
Proportion on the one hand, and Beauty and Excellence, on the
other (64E6-7).
So all three--Truth, Proportion and B e a uty-taken together make the mixture good.
By
considering
separately
each
part
of
the
G o o d - -B e a u t y ,
Proportion and Truth--in relation to both pleasure and k n o w l e d g e ,
Plato shows that knowledge is more akin to the highest Good than
pleasure.
As such, it is more honorable among humans and gods
(65A-B).
In the dialogue, Socrates reaches these conclusions by
comparing
pleasure as a class to the highest type of knowledge,
namely, nous
(i.e. intuitive reason) and phronesis (practical
reasoning).
[Henceforth I shall only refer to these two Greek
terms since they are less clumsy than the English ones.
Also,
the significance of the lumping of these two terms together I
shall consider at the end of this paper.]
He says that nous is
either truth itself or the most like it while pleasure is the
greatest
of impostors
(65C).
Likewise,
nothing
is more
in
harmony with measure than mind while the
opposite is true of
pleasure.
Finally, phrones is and nous are never unseemly whereas
the greatest pleasures are ridiculous or disgraceful (65E-66A).
Consequently, in the final ranking of possessions for the good
life,
the 'eternal nature' (i.e. the G o o d ) ^ has chosen measure,
the mean,
fitness and all considered similar to these to be
first.
Second
is
proportion,
beauty,
completeness
and
sufficiency,
and all belonging to that kind.
Third come nous and
phrones is .
To fourth place belong the lower forms of knowledge,
technai (i.e. skills), and true opinions since they are more akin
to pleasure than to the Good.
In fifth and last place
are the
painless and pure pleasures (66A-C).
This final ranking summarizes the previous discussion of the
roles of pleasure and knowledge in the good life.
An exploration
of how Plato
arrived at the ranking will provide a better
understanding of his account of the Good.
In general, the order
of goods in the final ranking
is determined by
how we can best
express the universal Good by realizing our proper place within
the order of reality.
This task requires an awareness of how our
human needs for both pleasure and knowledge can be structured so
as to reflect what is objectively good, i.e. what the "eternal
nature" itself would choose.
Earlier in the dialogue,
Plato
made it clear that
limit and measure, as well as purity and
truth,
should be used as criteria in distinguishing
between
higher and lower pleasures and forms of cognition.
To
examine
how Plato used
these criteria is thus important.
During the classification of pleasure, two basic kinds emerged.
First are the mixed pleasures, so called because they are mixed
with
their
opposite,
pain.
These
pleasures
are
classified
differently
depending
upon
what
aspects
of
them
are
being
considered.
In regard to their inherent capacity for extension
in degree of intensity, magnitude and number, the mixed or impure
7

pleasures belong to the indefinite class (52C-D).
This aspect of
the mixed pleasures is experienced when a pleasure originates
from abnormal and/or inordinate desires, be they physical or
psychological (44B-51A).
The pleasures of the profligate, the
homosexual prostitute, and
the emotionally distressed would all
fall into the indefinite c a t e g o r y .^
On the other hand, when
limit is imposed on the mixed pleasures through intelligence,
then
they
are
considered
members
of
the
class
where
the
indefinite is mixed with the definite
(3l A f f .)
The limited
aspect of these pleasures would be experienced in connection with
health and strength^®.
The second main type of pleasure consists of the pure pleasures
which are by their very nature limited.
These include not only
ones free from pain (e.g. the smell of a rose), but also those
whose objects are relatively simple:
the formal representations
involved in geometry, music, and art.
These latter pleasures are
considered to be 'divine' (51B-52C) because they are the closest
link to the Forms the experience of pleasure can afford.
The key to the classification of pleasure is to compare the
different varieties according to the criteria of limit, purity
and truth.
Those that are inherently unlimited are hopelessly
impure, being mixed with their opposite, pain.
These pleasures
Socrates also considers to be false because their unlimitedness
and indefiniteness inevitably lead to distortions of reality in
one of three basic ways.
In the first, the agent acts as if what
is at best extrinsically valuable were intrinsically so, e.g. a
miser who lives as if the acquisition of currency has value in
itself.
In the second, the agent exaggerates the pleasure of
satisfaction,
e.g., when someone breaks his diet and,
in an
attempt
to
rationalize
what
he
knows
is
a
poor
choice,
exaggerates his enjoyment while eating the forbidden sweets. 1
In the third, what is really in itself neither pleasant nor
painful is experienced as pleasant because one has just escaped
from pain and this freedom seems pleasant by comparison to the
pain just experienced.
An example of this is the belief someone
might have that she is experiencing pleasure because the dentist
has stopped drilling.
All these distortions have as their source
the inherent indefiniteness of the pleasures involved.
That is,
the confused mixture of pleasure and pain in these situations
will inevitably confuse the agent. By contrast, the pleasures
that are intrinsically limited and pure are true, i.e. accurately
reflect reality.
Not surprisingly, in the final ranking the true
and pure pleasures are admitted into the good life while the
inherently indefinite pleasures are b a r r e d ^ . These latter are a
hindrance to the pure pleasures and prevent the higher types of
intelligence from coming about at all (63D-64A).
Although the fact that the pure and true pleasures are superior
to the impure, mixed ones is obvious enough, exactly how truth
and purity are related is not clear.
Throughout most of the
classification of pleasure, Plato seems to have used the
words
"purity" and "truth" as more or less equivalent terms.
But at
one point (52D) Socrates asks whether pure or impure pleasures
8

are more closely related to truth.
To help explain what he means
by " p u r i t y " , he gives an example:
unmixed white.
Clearly, there
is a sense in which unmixed white is more white than that which
is mixed with other colors.
But Socrates goes on to conclude
that it is also the truest and most beautiful of all whiteness.
Although he does not explain the relations between purity, truth,
and beauty explicitly, he does say enough to convey the general
point.
Purity is valuable, even highly valuable,
in its own
right and not just as the absence of impurity, which in the case
of pleasure means being mixed with pain.
For something to be
what it is and nothing else is to be a clear reflection of the
definiteness of the basic structure of reality.
Even in our
experiences (p a t h e . 31B) of pleasure we may affirm our connection
with the beautiful and well-proportioned whole of reality of
which we are a part.
This is the significance of the pure
pleasures, which are true because they unambiguously exemplify
the
definiteness,
proportion,
and
beauty
that
underlie
the
surface of human life.
Purity is likewise used as a criterion in the classification of
knowledge, for it is equated to exactness (57B) and related to
truth (57D).
These criteria first are used to rank different
kinds of
skilled work according
to the extent to
which they
employ
arithmetic,
the science
of measurement
and weighing.
Music (i.e. playing by ear), medicine, a g r i c u l t u r e , piloting, and
generalship are all examples of imprecise skills (technai). while
building
is
more
exact
because
it
uses
a good
number
of
measurements and instruments (55 E -56 C ) . Furthermore, within both
arithmetic and the science of measurement are two distinct kinds:
those of
the many and those of the philosophers.
Concerning
arithmetic, some reckon unequal units, e.g. two armies, while
others
insist
on units
that are all equal
to one another.
Likewise, calculation (logis tike)
and measuring used in building
and trade
differ from the geometry of philosophers
(56D-57A,
57D) .
The 'phil o s o p h i c 'arithmetic and metrical arts surpass the
more pedestrian varieties in purity, exactness
and truth (57D)
just as some pleasures are purer and truer than others (57B). The
truest form of knowledge is the dialectic, defined as "...that
knowledge which has to do with being
and reality
and that which
is always
the
same
(5 8A1-2).
It is called called nous
and
p h r o n e s i s . "the contemplation of true Being" (59 D 4 -5)^ ^ . S o , the
extent of truth or purity involved in the various forms of
technai and
knowledge depends
upon the definiteness
of their
respective objects.
Insofar as all forms of cognition are limited or definite to
some extent, all are included in the final ranking of
the good
life.
Many
commentators have taken this as a signal
that the
Philebus
departs
from
the
epistemology
of
the
Republie
in
recognizing
the
technai
as
genuine
forms
of
knowledge .^
However» a closer look at the two dialogues reveals that in both
discussions the lower forms have a legitimate role in the good
life provided that one first has the higher.
In the P h i l e b u s . as
we have seen, the distinction between philosophical and practical
9

mathematics is based on the types of objects with which each type
of mathematics deals, e.g. practical arithmetic is concerned with
unequal units while the philosophical variety has as its objects
only equal units.
In the R e p u b l i c . the distinction between
practical and philosophical mathematics arises in the context of
Socrates'
search
for
a
program
of
study
which
would
be
appropriate for the guardian-rulers who
eventually will become
philosophers but will be trained as warriors when young.
Thus
one criterion for the type of study required will be that it "not
be useless to soldiers" (521D, 525B).
Number and calculation is
then singled out as "the thing common to all crafts, thought, and
forms of knowledge: (522C1-2) and as that which "every craft and
form of knowledge must necessarily participate in" (522C7-8),
including the art of war (550C10-11).
Similarly, geometry can be
used for organizing battle formations, etc. (526D).
But the most
important use of both arithmetic and geometry is to turn the soul
away from the sensible world towards truth and Being (521C, 525B,
525C,
526E,
527B) .
This transition from a mere reckoner or
calculator of troops or battle formations to a reckoner of Being
(525B5-6) and contemplator of the Idea of the Good (526E1) is
made possible by the study of pure numbers in which every unit is
equal to every other (526A) and
by geometry as the knowledge of
what "always is being" (527B7-8).
As we have seen, the objects of philosophical mathematics are
described in similar terms in the P h i l e b u s . Does this mean that
these objects are meant to serve as a bridge to the realm of
Being and the Good in the Philebus as in the Repub lie?
The
Philebus indicates that this is so, though less explicitly than
the R e p u b l i e . The objects of divine knowledge, as well as those
of divine pleasure, are clearly objects of a higher ontological
status
than
those
of
the
less
pure
types
of pleasure
and
knowledge.
The divine circle, sphere, etc. are at least closer
than sensibles to true Being if not members of the realm of Being
t h e m s e l v e s .^
At any rate, the knowledge of divine mathematical
objects, along with phrones is regarding
Justice itself and n o u s .
is considered to be more important than the lower forms of
knowledge which are needed for the practical purposes of life, so
that one may "find his way home" (6 2 B 7 -8 ) .
But such practical
types are truly good only if one has divine knowledge (62B;D).
The latter, called nous and phr one sis in the final ranking, is
put into a separate class from the lower varieties of cognition.
This fact underscores the point that the divine knowledge of the
dialectic is significantly different from the lower types because
it has as its explicit aim the discovery of ultimate reality.
Put differently, this last aspect of the ranking is important
as an instance of where an appeal to the universal, and not just
the human,
Good is being made.
Although recognition of the
crucial importance of limit in terms of obvious human goods such
as health and excellence may be easy, the superiority of the
dialectic to all other forms of cognition takes us beyond what we
can value in strictly practical t e r m s . The dialectic is superior
in terms of both knowledge and value simply because Its
objects
10

are
o n t o l ogically
superior.
At
58A-59C,
a
passage
very
reminiscent of the Republic .
the objects of the dialectic are
contrasted to those of techne in terms of stability, purity and
truth.
The
former
are,
to
use
Gregory
Vlastos'
phrase,
"cognitively
dependable",
but
are
so,as
I
have
argued
elsewhere^
because
they,
unlike
sensibles,
are real without
qualification. The phrase,
"true
Being", also has evaluative
connotations that are grounded in the ontological sense of truth
as what must be present for anything to be.
Truth, as an aspect
of the Good, enables everything
to have
whatever measure of
existence or Being it does.
To appreciate fully the truth, then,
one must accord to everything its proper value as an expression
of a true understanding of reality,
both d i s tributively and
collectively.
The dialectic, which was earlier identified with
the Divine Method (at 1.7A4·).,· makes this understanding possible by
revealing the basic structure of the
realm of true Being, which
in turn explains the underlying order of the sensible world.
In
fact, the dialectic here, as in the R e p u b l i c . ultimately leads to
the Good.
Let us now consider how this is so.
The Divine Method assumes that there is a one, a comprehensive
unit or Form which ultimately unites the indefinite sensible
phenomena under it via a definite number of parts or aspects.
In
the final pages of the P h i l e b u s . the Good, described earlier (at
20D) as the most perfect or complete of all entities, appears as
the ultimate one or unit.
The point was also made earlier (at
54CalO) that part (m o i r a ) of the Good is
"that for the sake of
which anything is
generated",
i.e., Being.
In other words,
Becoming (what is
generated) is for the sake of Being in the
sense that the latter is the end or good towards which the former
moves.
The suggestion here is that
Being or the World of the
Forms is that part of the Good which serves as the final or
teleological cause
for the sensible w o r l d . ^ Plato does
not
explain this further but instead concentrates on those aspects of
the Good which are particularly relevant to the question of the
good life:
Truth, Proportion and Beauty.
This description of
the Good, then, is what we would expect given the Divine Method's
recommendation to look for a one, then the many parts it has,
identifying those aspects that are relevant to the subject in
question, and classifying sensibles according to these aspects
into general types.
Individual sensible phenomena are recognized
as being indefinite.
In terms of the good life, the types of pleasure and knowledge
that are part of the mixture are those which admit of some
measure or proportion and truth while those pleasures that are
inherently indefinite are left out.
Measure or limit, as well as
purity and truth, are used to rank the various types of knowledge
and pleasure.
The highest types are called 'divine' because
their objects belong, or are most akin, to the realm of true
Being, which is part of the Good.
So when pleasure and knowledge
are
compared
in terms
of the
three
aspects
of the Good - Proportion, Beauty and Truth--we should not be surprised that
knowledge, in particular the highest type, is once again shown to
11

be the more important element in the good life.
The fact that the highest type of knowledge is referred to as
nous and phr one s is is also significant.
Nous is related to
noes is « the intuitive vision or grasp of the Forms in the Divided
Line of the Repub 1i c . Although, as has been already noted, Plato
is moving away from the visual/tactile model of knowledge in the
Philebus , the term nous still might refer to a type of knowledge
which, once realized, is self-evident.
But what is of particular
interest
is
the
fact
that nous
is coupled with phr ones is .
practical reasoning.
The implication is that we must have both
an intuitive awareness of the basic structure of reality and the
ability to make use of this insight in our attempt to order human
life.
Thus we might say, according to the Philebus . that the
philosophers would not be tempted to stay in a state of perpetual
contemplation in order to enjoy the Good.
For even physical
pleasures, if experienced in the right way, bear the imprint of
the d i v i n e .
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NOTES
1.
The lone voice of dissent on the issue of the dating of the
Philebus is that of Robin Waterfield who claims that it is a
middle dialogue.
He does so on doctrinal considerations, i.e.
that since the Philebus makes an ontological dis tinetion between
Being and Becoming, retains paradigmatic F o r m s , e t c . it must be a
middle dialogue.
But this conclusion only follows if one already
assumes that Plato went through a 'critical period' when he wrote
the Parmenides and afterwards abandoned these elements of his
earlier metaphysics.
( See his "The Place of the Philebus in
Plato's Dialogues," Phrones is V o l . X X V , n o . 3, 1980, p p . 270-305.)
Given the fact that Waterfield fails to justify this assumption,
he offers no reasons to reject the traditional late dating of the
Philebus based upon the stylometric evidence provided by the
diverse methods of Campbell, Lutoslawski, Ritter, and Brandwood.
The Philebus was certainly written after
the Parmenides
and
Plato's first trip to Syracuse (367 B.C.) and perhaps after the
second visit in 361 B.C.
2.
Of
c o u r s e , there
is
a similar
tension
in Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics between the life of practical virtue and that
of contemplation.
What I shall demonstrate above is that in the
P h i l e b u s . Plato reduces this tension considerably with his idea
of the mixed life where types of pleasure and knowledge are
ordered in such a way as to reflect, as much as possible, the
structure of the Forms.
Here he makes it clearer that although
we live in the sensible world, we are called to live within it in
a way that helps embody its ultimate source:
the universal Good.
3.
All I am suggesting here is that this reading of the passage
is plausible , not that it is true.
In fact, I think that the
evidence weighs heavily against this reading.
I heartily agree
with, e.g., David Hitchcock when he claims that the Good in the
Republic is a Form (see 4 7 6 A 4 -5, 5 0 5 a 2 , 507B5- 7, 508E2-3, 517B8Cl, 534B9-C1), 'has' being (509D1), and can be known (see 508E4,
517B8-C1,534B3-C5).
In light of this, it is important to note
the wav in which the Good is said to be beyond Being, i.e. in
dignity and power.
Similarly, the Good was said at 508E5-6 and
509a4-5 to be more beautiful and more greatly to be honored than
being and truth.
(See David Hitchcock,
"The Good in Plato's
Republic " . Ape i r o n . vol. 19, Fall 1985, p. 90, n. 56.) It seems
to me that the point here is that the Good is more valuable and
powerful than anything
else because it is the ultimate
first
principle of reality, not because it is completely transcendent.
4.
Julia Annas raises the point about Plato wanting to remove
conflicts of interests, fSee An Introduction to Plato's R e p u b l i c .
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985), p p . 104-5.]
She does so in the
context of criticizing him from a contemporary liberal democratic
standpoint which assumes
the primacy of such values
as the
enhancement of individual autonomy.
Whatever the merits of her
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critique,
I think that it is important to remember that Plato's
primary aim is the embodiment of unity. Although, of course, the
ancient Greeks were not generally
concerned with individual
autonomy, Plato is
quite aware that his emphasis on unity may
interfere with the happiness of the individual or at least with a
particular class of society.
5.

Annas

cites this example,

i b i d .. p p . 93-94.

6.
This
lack
of
appreciation
of
the
intrinsic
value
of
difference distinguishes Plato's ideal from other communitarians,
including contemporary proponents such as Alasdair MacIntyre and
Stanley Hauerwas.
See, e.g., the former's After Virtue (Notre
Dame:
Notre Dame University Press,
2nd ed. , 1984), and the
latter's
A Community
of
Character____Towards
a
Constructive
Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press,
1981).MacIntyre's
communitarianism
is in the
Aristotelian
tradition while Hauerwas'
is based on his conception of the
Christian church as a community called to the telling and the
enactment of the gospel story.
7.
No doubt there are other interpretations of Hinduism.
I
don't wish to push the parallel between Plato and Hinduism too
far.
But given the Eastern influence found in Plato's mythology
of the soul,
reincarnation,
and punishment
in the afterlife
found, for example, in the myth of Er in the Republic . there is
some ground for comparison.
8.
This
is
G.M.A.
Grube's
translation,
Plato's
Republic
(Indianapolis:
Hackett Press, 1974).
All other translations are
mine from J. Burnet,
Platonis O p e r a . 5 vols.
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1900-1905.)
9.
See Hitchcock, ibid. . p. 79.
As evidence, he quotes 61IB10 612a5 about the true nature of the soul which would be revealed
only if it escaped bodily taint and gave itself entirely to the
longing for the divine.
For only then "one would see ... whether
it is many-formed or single -f o r m e d , or in what way it is and
h o w ” . Hitchcock interprets this passage as a hint that the soul
is in fact "single and uniform, mono e ides (612a4).
It is pure
reason."
Of course, it do^s not necessarily follow from the fact
that the soul is said to be akin to the divine and the immortal
that it is s ingle -f o r m e d .
But the entire passage certainly is
ascetic
in
tone
and
this
in
itself
is
evidence
of
the
contemplative model of the good life.
10.

I b i d . . p.

82.

11.
Throughout the P h ilebus. there are references to the divine,
including passages where he implies that the divine life which is
free from pleasure and pain is the best one of all (22C5-D5; 32E33C; 55A; 65B).
Thus the divine life is held up as an ideal that
14
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we are to approximate.
It is unclear, however, whether this
means that we should minimize
or avoid all pleasures, or all
those mixed with pain, or just those which are indeterminately
mixed.
I shall discuss
these difficulties
above,
but some
ambiguity still remains.
12/ See Book I of the Nicomachean E t h i c s . especially Aristotle's
critique of the universal Platonic Good in Chapter 5.
13.
The key passage is 15B1-8 where these serious puzzles
(apo r i a i ) are stated.
The passage is rather ambiguously worded
and thus much controversy surrounds how to interpret the puzzles
and even how many (two or three?) of them there are.
For a brief
overview of the controversy, see R. M. Dancy, "The One, The Many,
and the Forms:
Philebus
15B1-8,", Ancient P h i l o s o p h y . vol.4,
1984.
Fortunately, for the purposes of this paper, this issue
need not be explored.
I also think that the units (which Plato calls "monads")
are
Forms
which are
ontologically
prior to
their
sensible
instances but to argue for this would go beyond the scope of this
paper.
14.
Waterfield notes that the Greek classification was based on
how much breath it took to sound a particular letter; vowels took
the most, mutes (our 'stops') took the least, with the s e m i 
vowels (our nasals, sibilants and continuants) in-between.
See
Waterfield,
Plato Ph i1e b u s . (Harmondsworth, Middlesex,
England
and New York:
Penguin Books Ltd, 1982,) p.63, n. 2. Perhaps
Plato sees the letters, as well as musical notes,
forming a
continuum.
When making the same division of
letters
in the
C r a t v l u s . Plato does draw a parallel between this division and
the one of musical sound into rhythms (see 423E-425A; cited by
Waterfield,
ibid.) For our present purposes, the details of this
account need not be determined.
15.
The fact that the visual/tactile model is used throughout
the middle dialogues iä noted by Henry Teloh, The Development of
Plato's
Metaphysics.
(University
Park
and
London:
The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981) p p . 100-118.
16.
A.
E.
Taylor
and
Paul
Shorey
believe
that
Plato
is
condemning the fact that the one and the many are features in our
thought and language. [See Taylor, Plato Philebus and E p i n o m i s .
R. Klinbansky,
G. Calogero,
and A. C. Lloyds, eds . , (London:
Thomas
Nelson
& Sons,
1956),
p.109,
and
Shorey,
"Recent
Platonism in England", American Journal of P h i l o l o g y , vol. IX,
1888, pp . 281-283.]
But all Socrates actually condemns at 15D16B is the way the young (and philosophically immature) misuse
this fact.
17.
I agree with Bury and Hackforth in emphasizing the close tie
between truth and reality or Being.
See R.G. Bury, The Philebus
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of Plato (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1897), Appendix
F. , pp . 2 0 1 f f . ; and
R.
Hackforth,
P l a t o fs
Examination
of
P l e a s u r e . (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1954), p. 133.
For
a different view, see J.C.B. Gosling, Plato P h i l e b u s . (Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 134-135; pp. 212 seq.
18.
The personification of the Good occurs elsewhere in the
P h i l e b u s . notably in the discussion of the Cause at 26E-31A where
it is depicted as the creator of all (30E1-2), including the
mixed kind (26E-27C).
As I have argued elsewhere, there is no
need to take the talk of the Cause's generation and production
literally.
(See Cynthia Hampton,
"Plato's Late
Ontology:
A
Riddle Unresolved", Anclent P h i l osophy. vol. VIII,no. 1, Spring
1988, p.110-111; 115, n.16.)
Here I would like to add that one
reason
Plato
might
have
in
using such
language
and
for
personifying the Good as a creator is to give us a representation
of the Good which makes it clearer to us how we can model our own
activities in imitation of
the Forms.
For if we
think of the
Good itself as the producer and governor of the cosmic order
according to n o u s . phronesi s . and s o p h i a . then we can better
grasp the fact that the exercise of our own versions of these
intellectual
faculties
is
crucial
in
bringing
about
and
maintaining order in the human sphere. (A similar reason might
also help to explain the use of the demiurge in Republic Book X
and in the Timaeus .)
The significance of coupling nous w ith
phrones is in describing the mental powers we are to employ I
shall discuss above.
19.
Unfortunately, Plato is not terribly forthcoming with clear
examples of abnormal and inordinate pleasures.
One example he
gives is the pleasure an invalid experiences when scratching an
itch caused by a disease (44B-46B).
He also alludes to a sexual
experience at 46D-47A but does not indicate whether the pleasures
here are abnormal,
inordinate,
or both.
The example of the
passive homosexual
(the kinaidos) whose passivity may include
'being kept'
or even being a prostitute,
and whose life is
compared to one of perpetual scratching, I have borrowed from
Gorgias 494E.
The life of such a one is clearly thought by Plato
to
be
disgraceful,
and
perhaps
abnormal.
As
examples
of
pleasures that arise from psychic abnormalities and/or excesses
he refers to those involving anger, fear, yearning, mourning,
love,
jealousy,
envy,
etc.
(46B-48B) .
The only emotions he
actually analyzes here are those aroused by comedy:
the mixture
of the pain of malice with the pleasure of laughing at the
misfortunes
of
others
(48B-50E).
But
discussion
of
this
complicated case would take us too far afield from our present
purpose.
20.
Somewhat confusingly, Plato refers to both the pleasures
that
are
mixed with
pain,
and
those
which
are
limited by
intelligence, as being mixed, measured, or limited.
But I take
the mixture with pain to be the broader category, including both
16

the
inherently
indefinite
pleasures
and
those
limited
by
intelligence.
For the pleasures limited by intelligence still
include
pain,
e.g.
the
pleasures
of
health
involve
the
restoration of bodily imbalances.
21.
For more on these two types of false pleasure, see Cynthia
H a m p t o n , "P l e a s u r e , Truth and Being in Plato's P h i l e b u s : A Reply
to Professor Frede", Phronesis Vol. XXXII, no. 2, 1987, p p . 253 262.
22.
There remains the problem of
where the pleasures which are
limited by intelligence (i.e. the necessary pleasures attending
health, strength etc.) are supposed to fit in the final ranking.
Taylor and Hackforth
speculate that the reference to a sixth
class at 66C-D is meant to encompass the necessary pleasures
while Gosling explains the omission by pointing out that the
prize-giving is not between all elements of the good life but
only
those
which
contribute
to
its
goodness.
See Taylor,
o p .ci t . . p. 91; Hackforth, op. ci t . . p. 139; p.140, n. 3; and
Gosling, o p .c i t . . p. 224.
Perhaps Taylor and Hackforth are right
but it is still puzzling why there is no explicit reference to
what comprises the sixth class.
I find Gosling's suggestion
unsatisfactory because
the necessary pleasures
include
those
which promote fitness, health and virtue (62E-63A,
63E), and
these elements,
(especially virtue),
surely contribute to the
goodness of the mixed life.
23. As Hackforth notes (op. c i t . . p. 124, n.l), Plato does not
always restrict the meaning of the terms n o u s . phronesis and
epist e m e . But the context
strongly suggests that the first two
terms refer to a specially elevated form of knowledge.
The
reference to 'contemplation' simply means knowledge of the Forms
which includes intuiting them (i.e. n o u s ) . but also involves
knowing how to embody them in our lives (i.e. phrones is).
We
shall discuss this more above.
Concerning the use of the term 'ep i s t erne ' , it is used in the
Philebus in a general sense as something roughly equivalent to
'c o g n i t i o n ' , the term I use above.
In this general sense, it is
sometimes used in conjunction with t e c h n e . Roger Shiner in his
monograph, Knowledge and Reality in Plato's P h i l e b u s . (Assen:
Koninklijke Van Gorcum &/Comp. B.V., 1974), p.55, points to the
interchangability of the terms episteme and techne as evidence of
the radical shift in the Philebus from the epistemology in the
R e p u b l i c . But as Richard Mohr has pointed out [in "Philebus 55C62A and Revisionism", New Essays on P l a t o , ed. Francis Jeffry
Pelletier and John King-Farlow, (Guelph:
Canadian Association
for Publishing in Philosophy, The University of Calgary Press,
1983), p. 166] Plato does not consistently use technical language
even in the Repub1 i c . Note Republic 533B1-6 where the dialectic
is called a t e c h n e .
In response to Mohr, Shiner claims (in
"Knowledge in Philebus 55C-62A; A Response", New Essays on P l a t o ,
17
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172)
that
the
language
in the Re pub lie suggests
that the
dialectic is the only way to knowledge whereas the Philebus does
not.
But as I argue above, it is true that in both dialogues,
the
dialectic
is
the
highest
form
of
cognition
and hence
knowledge
in the
full or true
sense,
and the lower forms,
in c ludí ng t e c h n e . p r esuppose it.
For more ο n Sh i ne r 's p osition
and my responses to it, see n. 24 below.

rp·.

24. Commentators who argue that such a radical shift between the
epistemologies of the Repub1 ic
^nd the Phileb us has taken place
include
Roger
Shiner
and Henry
Telöh.
Besides
the points
mentioned in n.lO above, Shiner also cites as evidence:
1) the
absence of the contrast in the Philebus between the visible and
the intelligible, 2) the absence of a 'definitional association'
of the dialectic with being able to 'give an account' in the
Philebus as compared to the Republic ( e .g . 531D9-E5), and 3) the
fact
that
in
the
Ph i l e b u s . the
dialectic
and
techne
are
distinguished only in terms of purity, accuracy and clarity, i.e.
in terms of degree rather than in kind.
(See S h i n e r . on .c i t . .
pp . 56-57;61-66.)
Henry Teloh makes a similar point when he says
that
in the P h i l e b u s . the Divine or the Collection and Division
Method
can
be
applied
by
everyone,
cobblers
as
well
as
philosophers.
But in the Repub1ic only the philosophers can know
the Forms and it is this knowledge , combined with erotic desire
for the truth,
that distinguishes them from the warriors and
artisans.
So the dialectic is the only form of knowledge, not
just the highest.
See T e l o h , o p .ci t . . p .181 .
My response is as follows:
1) If, as we have said (see n. 10),
the use of terminology is inconclusive then so is the absence of
any particular phrase.
Instead of isolating certain words from
the
context,
the
similarities
and
differences
between
the
Republic and Philebus must be judged according to the overall
point and tone of their respective discussions on the subject of
knowledge and methodology.
As I argue a b o v e , on these grounds it
seems that the Philebus can be seen as an ex tens ion of the
discussion of the Republic at least in terms of the good life.
2) Shiner seems to forget that the dialectic is associated with
the Divine Method which is based on the assumption that there is
a 'one'.
As I argue above, the ultimate 'one' turns out to be
the G o o d .
This idea is not f ar f rom the description of the
dialectic in the Republic which involves the descent from the
unhy p o th e t i c a 1 first principle of the Good (533C) .
3) As I argue above, the distinction between techne and the
dialectic
is
grounded
on
the
ontological
status
of
their
respective objects so to speak of differences in degree only is
misleading
since
the
objects
of
higher
ontological
status
actually belong to a different category of reality than those of
a lower status.
This point comes out clearly in the final
ranking where
the dialectic
is s ing1è d out and placed in a
separate and higher class than the other forms of cognition.
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It
is also worth
remembering
that
in
the
Republic.
the
dialectic,
as
the study of
the Good,
isthe
only
road
to
knowledge (533C) but this does
not mean that
it will be the only
form of knowledge once that road is taken up to the Good and then
back down the Divided Line.
Once
grounded inthe Good as the
unhypothesized first principle, mathematics could become genuine
knowledge.
25.
Of course,
the ontological status
of the mathematical
realities is not left obscure
in the Philebus
alone; there is
considerable
controversy
surrounding
those
entities
that
correspond to diano ia on the Divided Line as well.
Are these
Forms
orthe 'intermediate mathematical objects' Aristotle says
were a part of Plato's ontology (e.g. at Me taphvs ics 987B15)?
It
goes beyond the scope of this paper to engage in this discussion.
My only point here is that whatever the exact ontological status
of the mathematical entities, it is clear in the Republic that
the
study of them is to lead the aspiring philosophers
to
contemplation of Justice itself, etc. and there is reason to
believe that a similar point is being made in the Philebus as I
suggest a b o v e .
26.

See Hampton,

o p .cit . . p p . 256 -57.

27.
The "for the sake of" relation is illustrated at 53D
and
54C-D with the following:
brave lovers
for the sake of beloved
boys, shipbuilding for ships, and drugs for health.
It is fairly
clear that the beloved boys, ships, and health function as the
raison d'etre for the activities of acting bravely, shipbuilding,
and taking (or prescribing) drugs respectively.
Cf. Nicomachean
Ethics 1152B12-15 where Aristotle says that Plato believed the
end to be
superior
to the process of reaching it.
Plato's
immediate point in this passage of the Philebus is to argue that
pleasure cannot be the good since it is always becoming, but he
does so by appealing to the general inferiority of Becoming to
Being.
I think that ultimately the ontological implications of
this passage should be seen in terms of the causality of the
Good.
The Good is the direct cause of the order of the World of
the Forms which in turn serves as the teleological cause of the
sensible world.
But to prove this point would take us beyond our
present discussion.
1.
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